Abstract: If the Ukrainian economy is to be successfully restructured going forward, a restructured railway system will have to be part of the picture. This paper begins with a discussion of the crucial role that the Ukrainian railway plays in the Ukrainian economy. We follow with a survey of the world experience with railways restructuring: a large number of countries have already undertaken the task of converting sagging government-owned monopoly railways into more dynamic and competitive transport enterprises, and their experience in very diverse settings may have important lessons to offer. We then examine the current state of rail reform plans in Ukraine. We conclude with discussions of alternative paths forward that seem most likely to be successful in Ukraine, based on both the experience elsewhere and the country's current situation.
Introduction
If the Ukrainian economy is to be successfully restructured going forward, a restructured railway system will have to be part of the picture. Ukraine's economy depends on the production and sale of a number of bulk commodities, including coal, iron ore, steel, and agricultural products, that require shipment by rail in order to reach both domestic and export markets economically.
The current railway system -actually an awkward amalgam of six separate regional railways, each with a good deal of autonomy -suffers from aging locomotives and rolling stock as well as a badly depreciated infrastructure that causes traffic bottlenecks at crucial locations. An important first step in creating a viable system going forward will be to find ways to attract investment into the system. Given competing demands on government resources, the international experience suggests that this will likely have to focus on private sector participation. Attracting private sector participation, in turn, will likely require a restructuring strategy that relies on market forces and competition rather than government decision makers to direct strategy and operations into the future.
In this paper we first discuss in more detail the crucial role that the Ukrainian railways plays in the Ukrainian economy. We follow with a survey of the world experience with railways restructuring: a large number of countries have already undertaken the task of converting sagging government-owned monopoly railways into more dynamic and competitive transport enterprises, and their experience in very diverse settings may have important lessons to offer. We then examine the current state of rail reform plans in Ukraine. We conclude with discussions of alternative paths forward that seem most likely to be successful in Ukraine, based on both the experience elsewhere and the country's current situation.
Ukrainian railways and the Ukrainian economy
Ukraine's economy is based on the production of bulk commodities that generally travel most economically by rail -especially given the relatively poor condition of the country's road and highway system. Ukraine is among the top ten world producers of iron ore, steel, coking coal, wheat, corn, and sunflower oil. Coal (both utility and coking) is the leading commodity carried by rail, making up about a fourth of annual volume; steel, iron ore, and related products make up another quarter; and grains and building materials make up a good portion of the rest. Container traffic has a small but growing presence, especially as transit traffic. A good deal of the freight traffic originates in the east, including coal from the Donbas, iron ore and steel from the Kryvbas, and import and transit traffic from the Russian Federation.
The railway itself is the fourteenth largest in the world in track-km and the sixth most densely operated (as measured by train units per track-km).
1 It is a freight-dominant railway, carrying the seventh highest total of ton-km of 1 "Train units" is a standard analytical measure that provides a rough estimate of train operating presence on the infrastructure in countries in which both freight and passenger train operations are significant. Train unit is defined as the sum of freight-ton-km and passenger-km.
freight in the world (and not far behind Kazakhstan for sixth place). On the other hand, by medium-to-large country standards, the Ukrainian railways also carry a large number of passengers -in the neighborhood of 20% of train units, a considerably greater percentage than the Russian and Kazakh railways, for example. The combination of export traffic and transit traffic makes up half of the freight tonnage; a significant portion of this has been freight originating in Russia and ultimately departing from Ukraine either by rail to the west (especially to Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Hungary) or by sea to the south (especially via greater Odessa). Ukrainian railways is actually a collection of six regional railways, each of which enjoys a good deal of autonomy: the Donets Railway, the Lviv Railway, the Odessa Railway, the Southern Railway (Kharkiv), the Southwestern Railway (Kyiv), and the Near-Dnipro Railway (Dnipropetrovsk) (see Map 1). The Donets, Near-Dnipro, and Odessa have traditionally been the most heavily used and the most important for freight, given their locations centered on coal mining (Donets), iron ore and steel production (Near-Dnipro), and port activities (Odessa). Both international lenders and local reformers have expressed frustration at the inability of the central government and/or railway administration to impose more effective centralized control on these regional lines.
Map 1: Six Ukrainian railways.
Railways Restructuring and Ukrainian Economic Reform
Freight tariffs on the Ukrainian railways are set on the same basis that was used when the Ukrainian railways were a part of Soviet railways: on the old tariff book Tariff 10-01. As in Russia, Tariff 10-01 separates freight tariffs into three broad classes of commodities that may be roughly categorized as raw materials, intermediate goods, and final products: -Class I commodities include coal, ores, timber, and construction materials such as sand, stone, and concrete. -Class II includes oil, grain, fertilizers, food, and a broad collection of intermediate goods.
-Class III contains finished chemicals and metals, machinery, and most finished manufactured goods. Individual tariffs in each category are then determined using a declining scale for distance of haul and adjusting for shipment size and charges for loading and unloading. The overall rationale behind the tariff structure is basically twofold: to encourage long-distance shipments, especially of coal, at affordable rates, and to charge for shipping each commodity no more than a target percentage of its delivered price.
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Like many railways around the world, the Ukrainian railway is required to cross-subsidize loss-making passenger operations from the profits of its freight operations. Also like many railways around the world, this requirement to crosssubsidize passenger operations has made it more difficult for the railway to devote sufficient resources to the maintenance of current equipment and the acquisition of new equipment (though through 2013 the combined enterprise was earning net profits). 3 The result is that the locomotive and rolling stock parks are heavily depreciated and generally in poor operating condition; likewise, the track infrastructure is heavily depreciated and exhibits costly bottlenecks in several regions of the country. 4 A high priority going forward will be a 2 See, for example, ECMT (2004), Dementiev (2006), and Pittman (2013a) . The second rationale is similar to the traditional system of "value-of-service" pricing applied in the United States in the days when rail freight shipments were closely regulated (Kahn 1970 3 The world experience with railways restructuring
The decades of the 1990s and the 2000s were everywhere periods of neoliberal reform and privatization strategies in general and in the railways sector in particular (Gómez-Ibáñez and de Rus, 2006) . As in other infrastructure sectors, railways reforms around the world have tended to focus both on the introduction of private-sector participation and on the possibilities for the creation of competition in the context of what has been traditionally considered a natural monopoly. Also as in other infrastructure sectors, economists around the world have tended to favor the structural separation of going concerns as a sort of default option -as the generally preferred method of restructuring to create competition among users of a network. It has only been recently that much scholarly attention has been paid to the transactions cost implications of this policy in industries as diverse as railways, electricity, telecommunications, and water (Pittman, 2003 (Pittman, , 2007a (Pittman, , 2007b Xu, 2004) . A great deal of the policy debate regarding railways restructuring has concerned the possible creation of competition among multiple train-operating companies (TOCs) over a monopoly track infrastructure. With this possibility has come the question of whether such competition would be more effective in the presence of complete "vertical separation" between infrastructure and train operations or whether a less drastic "third-party access" regime -under which the incumbent Ukrainian Railways Company (Ukrzaliznytsia, or UZ) would remain vertically integrated but would be required to provide infrastructure access to independent TOCs under regulated terms and conditions -would be sufficient to support the introduction of competition, perhaps accompanied by some kind of "accounting separation" of the incumbent with the creation of an overall holding company. Although the UK's pioneering experience with complete vertical separation is generally considered a cautionary tale, the competition directorate of the European Community continues to push member countries in that direction. org.ua/articles/interview_with_the_deputy_minister_of_infrastructure_how_ukrzaliznytsia_will_be_ reformed. 5 See, e.g., Monti (2002) , Knieps (2014) and Montero (2014) .
Railways Restructuring and Ukrainian Economic Reform
As an alternative, minority voices in the debate have called for the creation of competition among multiple vertically integrated railway enterprises -a strategy sometimes termed "horizontal separation" to contrast it with "vertical separation" (Pittman, 2007a) . Under such a strategy, each railway enterprise runs trains on only the infrastructure that it controls, but shippers hope to enjoy either "parallel competition" -competing railway lines serving the same origindestination pairs, as is common in the United States and Canada -or "geographic competition" -competing railway lines radiating out from common points, as in Mexico and Argentina. Map 2 shows a stylized version of the Mexican railway system as it was restructured in the 1990s, with three vertically integrated companies competing mostly to carry freight in multiple directions between Mexico City and different ports and US gateways.
One notably successful aspect of the implementation of the horizontal separation model has been the attraction of private investments into these rail systems, initially in the form of bids for multi-decade franchise rights, and subsequently in the form of investments into the infrastructure, locomotives, and rolling stock of the newly created vertically integrated railways. In both Brazil and Mexico, for example, the governments required the controlling rights of each franchise to be held by domestic investors, but encouraged the participation of international investors. Table 1 shows the winning bids for the franchise rights that resulted from the franchising in the two countries and the lengths of the principal railways. I calculate that the 10 franchised freight railways average just over 4,000 track-km in length, and that the average winning bid was US$95,700 per track-km, in late 1990s US$.
Furthermore, in the 15 years following the restructuring in Mexico, private investments into the system totaled over US$6 billion -more than double the amount required and pledged by the consortia that won the concessions (Villa and Sacristán-Roy, 2013) .
As the railways reform debate has progressed and different options have been pursued in different countries, there is greater appreciation of the possibility that different reform strategies might be appropriate in different countries and environments. There has in many cases also come to be a differentiation in the strategic options pursued for freight and passenger operations (van de Velde, et al., 2012) .
The UK is a good example. As mentioned, that country has been one of the pioneers in the creation of competition in railways. Originally the focus was on complete vertical separation and the creation of competition among multiple independent TOCs in both the freight and passenger areas (Foster, 1994) . However, eventually it came to be widely believed that in an era of both widespread automobile ownership and discount airlines, passenger rail was dependent on government subsidies simply to survive. In that case on-track passenger rail competition was not sustainable, and the focus of policy moved to the creation of competition for monopoly franchises to control particular regional passenger rail operations in the tradition of Chadwick (1859) and Demsetz (1968) . 6 On the other hand, on the freight side the introduction of on-track competition has led to vigorous duopoly competition between the old English, Welsh, and Scottish railway (EWS, now a subsidiary of the German rail freight company DB Schenker) and Freightliner (Nash et al. 2013 ). More generally, around the world, freight-dominant railway systems pay their own way without large-scale government subsidies, and in fact generally earn profits, pay taxes, and crosssubsidize passenger operations.
Empirical efforts to evaluate systematically the outcomes of the recent spate of railways reforms around the world, and especially to isolate the relative performance of different reform models, have been hampered by problems of data availability and quality, the short time period involved since reforms have been implemented, differences among railways sectors in different countries, and the possible endogeneity of reforms -both the reform decision itself and the reform path chosen. The best and most recent studies suggest that most reform efforts have led to improved efficiency, though in addition to possible endogeneity one possible explanation here is simply that increased attention to industry structure and efficiency by itself leads to improvements. Among the more specific findings: -Where competition has been created among multiple TOCs -so-called abovethe-rail competition -for passenger operations, the European experience suggests that generally fares have been reduced and services have improved, but costs have increased, presumably reflecting the sacrifice of firm-level economies of density of operations (Nash, 2011; Preston and Robins, 2013 ). -Where competition has been created above-the-rail for freight, the European experience has been more conspicuously successful, with incumbents in several countries rapidly losing market share to more nimble entrants (Pittman et al. 2007; Deville and Verduyn, 2012; van de Velde et al., 2012; Knieps, 2013 ). -In general, reforms that have allowed additional TOCs to use the infrastructure have been found to increase operational efficiency as measured by data envelope analysis and stochastic production frontiers (Sánchez et al. 2008 , Sánchez et al. 2012 Couto and Graham, 2009; Friebel et al. 2010) . However, it is not at all certain that complete vertical separation is more conducive to the introduction of competition or to increased efficiency than is a third-party access model, perhaps structured around accounting separation of the incumbent (van de Velde, et al., 2012; Mizutani and Uranishi, 2013 ). -The alternative strategy of horizontal separation of freight railways -the creation of multiple competing vertically integrated freight railways -has in several cases succeeded in attracting a great deal of private investment into previously moribund state-operated railways and diverted significant levels of traffic from road back to rail, to the benefit of shippers, the broader economy, and the environment (Campos, 2001; Estache et al. 2001; Kogan, 2006; Thompson, 2009; Villa and Sacristán-Roy, 2013 ). -The vertical separation and third-party access models have mostly been applied in small-to medium-sized countries in Europe where passenger operations dominate the railways business. The horizontal separation model has mostly been applied in larger countries in the Americas where freight operations dominate the railways business -though some smaller Latin American countries have followed this strategy as well, including Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay (Kogan, 2006; Pittman, 2007a) .
Of course any discussion of the restructuring of existing railway enterprises raises the issue of the structure of railway costs. This is an issue that has been much examined in the empirical literature, though there are inevitably differences in results based on samples, assumptions, and techniques. We may summarize the discussion regarding three important aspects of railway cost functions as follows: -It seems by now well established that there are economies of vertical integration in railways, and thus that complete vertical separation increases transaction costs and operating costs -though the magnitude of increase is very much in dispute. 7 Vertical separation seems to increase costs more than otherwise (a) in rail systems that are very densely operated 7 Compare, for example, the estimates of Ivaldi and McCullough (2004) and Growitsch and Wetzel (2009) (economies of vertical integration as high as 40% of total costs), on the one hand, with the smaller estimates of Merkert (2012) and Merkert, Smith, and Nash (2012) (economies of vertical integration between 1% and 10% of total costs), on the other. It is worth noting here that the highest estimates strike many industry experts as simply not credible.
and (b) in rail systems with a high proportion of freight traffic vis-à-vis passenger traffic (van de Velde, et al., 2012; Mizutani and Uranishi, 2013) .
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The former likely reflects straightforward advantages of intrafirm rather than intrafirm coordination of operations, while the latter likely reflects the greater track wear caused by heavy freight trains, and the difficulty of getting the interfirm incentives set just right to address that problem (Pittman, 2005 ). -Economies of scale, as measured by system size, seem to be exhausted at relatively moderate scales of operation. Savignat and Nash (1999) report a consensus in the literature that only relatively small railways operate at a level of unexhausted economies of system size, and Wilson (1997) finds that at the mean of his sample, US class I railways are operating with slight diseconomies of system size. The results of Bitzan (1999) suggest a flattening of the cost curve for system size at around 5,000 miles, while Chapin and Schmidt (1999) also find a flattening of the cost curve, but at about twice that mileage level. 9 More recently, Christensen Associates (2010) conclude that all the major US railways are operating in a range of constant returns to scale and have been for many years. Note that the average size of the concessions granted in Brazil and Mexico was in the 4,000-4,500 trackkm range (Table 1) . -It appears, on the other hand, that economies of scale as measured by density of operations persist in more railway settings. Econometric studies have generally found that most existing freight railways are operating at levels where economies of density are not yet exhausted; this is the conclusion of a review of the literature by Savignat and Nash (1999) and of studies of US class I railways by Wilson (1997) , Ivaldi and McCullough (2001) , and Bitzan (2003) . Only recently has Christensen Associates (2010) concluded that the major US railways have likely exhausted all available economies of 8 One instructive indicator of the complexity of the debate concerns the fact that there are two different measures in common use of the density of rail system operations: (passenger-km þ freight ton-km)/track-km and train-km/track-km. A recent study apparently performed for the Russian railways (RSPP, 2013) noted especially the results of Mizutani and Uranishi concerning density and concluded from this that the densely operated Russian railways system would be a poor candidate for vertical separation. This conclusion may well be correct (Pittman, 2013a (Pittman, , 2013b , but unfortunately it does not follow from the results of that paper. The Russian railways are one of the world's most densely operated railways only using the former measure of density; concerning the latter they are actually below the world railway average, and Mizutani and Uranishi used the latter measure exclusively in their empirical work. 9 I am grateful to John Bitzan and Stephen Schmidt for confirming my interpretations of their published results in personal communications.
density, which is consistent with widespread reports of congestion and the difficulty of securing service on the major lines.
4 Railways restructuring in Ukraine
Ukraine by now has a long history of announced plans for restructuring the Ukrainian railways, but unfortunately very little record of actually implementing changes. Perhaps not surprisingly, given their common heritage and close relations until recently, the restructuring plans decided upon by the Ukrainian railways and government have been quite similar to those of the Russian and Kazakh railways. As I have discussed elsewhere (Pittman, 2013a) , the management of Russian railways took a long, detailed look at the world experience in railways restructuring -including the experience with vertical separation, third party access, and horizontal separation -and decided to choose "none of the above." The Russians rather crafted a restructuring model that could be characterized as a variant on the vertical separation model -but only in the sense that the locomotives and train-operating functions were included as a part of the infrastructure. Perhaps a clearer way to say this is that, once corporatization and the shedding of noncore enterprises were completed, Russian railways reforms have consisted mostly of allowing third parties to act as both rolling stock owners or lessors and as freight forwarders (i.e., brokers between shippers and the railway to arrange transportation). The result has been a surge of privately owned rolling stock, but trains are operated, and infrastructure controlled, by the Russian Railways Company (Rossiyskie Zheleznye Dorogi, or RZhD).
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In Russia -and now in Ukraine as well -a new nomenclature has been introduced: rail "operators" are companies that own or lease their own rolling stock and may act as freight forwarders vis-a-vis RZhD, while rail "carriers" are companies that own their own locomotives and run their own trains on the RZhD infrastructure. So far, independent carriers are an almost completely theoretical concept on both the Russian and the Ukrainian railways.
Ukraine has introduced detailed versions of the current reform plan for the railway in 2006, then again in 2009, and finally again in 2011. The 2011 plan, which is the current plan as I write, envisions three stages of reforms, beginning with the creation of a single joint stock company UZ and the separation of the operating and regulatory functions of the existing railways, moving through the spin-off of noncore activities, the elimination of the requirement that freight operations cross-subsidize passenger operations, and the freeing of tariffs for goods enjoying a "competitive transport market," and concluding by 2019 with a system of "equal access to the infrastructure facilities for all economic entities." As I write, officials are expressing hope for the achievement of the first goal, the transformation of UZ into a joint stock company, by the end of 2015.
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Since there are apparently no plans in Ukraine (or Russia) to separate control of the incumbent infrastructure from the incumbent locomotives and train operation, the language just quoted sounds like it might refer to an eventual third-party access regime, with independent carriers owning their own locomotives and running their own trains over the UZ infrastructure. In fact, however, in Ukraine (as in Russia) one stated goal of the reforms is to allow privately owned and operated passenger trains, but not -or at least not mentioned -freight trains.
13 This is probably the key to interpreting recent statements from the Ukrainian government that UZ will continue to enjoy monopoly "carrier" status in the foreseeable future, but that "private locomotives" may be permitted on the system within 5 years.
14 Thus, for the most important and lucrative 80% of Ukrainian railway operations, the only serious role contemplated for private investment and investors seems to be in rolling stock. 
Going forward?
Let's review the bidding. Ukraine is a medium-sized country with a freightdominant railway system, very different from the smaller, passenger-dominated systems that have experimented with complete vertical separation and third party access in Western Europe. Ukraine's railway system of about 23,000 track-km is likely in the range of constant returns to system size for railways; in addition, though this is smaller than the largest individual US railways, it is close to the same length as the total length of the Mexican railways system, which has been quite successfully divided into three privately controlled, vertically integrated enterprises competing for freight traffic going to and from Mexico City (i.e., mostly "geographic competition"). Ukraine's railway is one of the most densely operated systems in the world and so seems likely to be operating in a range of constant returns to density as well.
The question of whether and how to restructure the system at this point requires us to step back and ask a more basic question: What are we trying to accomplish here? As governments around the world have taken major steps to restructure their old government-owned monopoly railways -China and India are the only two major countries that have not done much in this regard -a divergent pattern has appeared. It seems fair to say that, in general, richer countries have restructured in order to increase efficiency, while poorer countries have restructured in order to attract private investment. To be sure, the poorer countries have sought increased efficiency as well, but their systems have generally been so starved for investment in both infrastructure and rolling stock that attracting private investment has been considered a necessary first step. That description would seem to fit Ukraine quite well.
To return to where we started: Ukraine is a country heavily dependent on its railway for hauling the bulk goods that will be the heart of the economy for the foreseeable future. If the economy is to grow and prosper, the railway must grow and prosper as well. How best to accomplish that? Let us term "Plan A" the current reform plan, repeatedly adopted and postponed over the past several years but apparently still the reigning scenario. This is basically identical to the Russian railway reform plan (Pittman, 2013a (Pittman, , 2013b , envisioning a corporatized, government-owned joint stock company UZ continuing to own and operate the infrastructure, control the locomotives, and run the freight trains, with private investors encouraged to supply their own rolling stock via discounts in the tariffs charged to shippers (and by the poor condition of the rolling stock available for hire from UZ).
The primary advantage of this reform model -indeed a real achievement of the Russian reforms to date -has been the attraction of large amounts of private investment into the rolling stock; in fact, by now more than half the Russian rolling stock park is privately owned. The primary disadvantage is that it fails to create an obvious avenue for private investment into locomotives and infrastructure, two areas of as great a need for additional resources as rolling stock in both Russia and Ukraine.
Thus under the current reform plan, the Ukrainian railway will be required to join the long queue for government revenues if it is to improve and increase its stock of locomotives as well as eliminating multiple infrastructure bottlenecks -arguably a significant disadvantage of Reform Plan A.
A possible Reform Plan B -arguably implementable both relatively easily and gradually -would be to allow UZ to remain a fully vertically integrated firm, controlling both infrastructure and its own train operations, but to require it to allow operations on its infrastructure by independent TOCs at regulated terms of access: a standard third-party access model. As noted above, this seems to be part of the long-term reform plan of the government for passenger operationsagain as in the Russian Federation -but it does not appear to be under serious consideration at this time on the freight side.
I would argue that this model deserves close consideration on the freight side as well. As noted above, third-party, independent TOCs have offered quite effective competition to incumbent, vertically integrated TOCs in a number of European countries -beginning in the east in Poland and Romania, but gradually moving west, especially as German incumbent DB and French incumbent SNCF have begun offering services in other countries. Particularly in Eastern Europe, many of the new TOCs entering into freight service have been large shippers of bulk freight integrating backward into transport operations in order to create alternatives for shipping both their inputs and their outputs. The result has been new investments not only in rolling stock but also in locomotives, as well as increased options and improved service for shippers, thus strongly supporting economic growth.
It seems likely that a number of large Ukrainian shippers would be candidates for backward vertical integration into TOCs in order to improve the quality of their own logistics (or to obtain better service from UZ by threatening to do so). Similarly, based on their past and current strategies, one would expect not only Germany's DB and France's SNCF but also Poland's PKP and, in a hoped-for peaceful future, Russia's RZhD to be interested in extending their train operations into Ukraine, if given the opportunity.
But that still leaves the infrastructure crying out for scarce government investment funds.
And this in turn argues for consideration of Plan C: a Mexican-style division of the entire UZ enterprise into two or three independent, vertically integrated railway companies, competing for the business of shippers mostly at points commonly served but perhaps over some parallel lines as well. 15 This option has been seriously discussed, though so far rejected, as a reform plan for RZhD in Russia, 16 and it would appear to hold a number of attractions for Ukraine as well -though a number of complications as well. Map 3 shows one published version of a Russian scenario, and Map 4 shows one possible, preliminary version of a Ukrainian scenario. The main advantages of such a plan are straightforward to list: the creation of competition for shippers, the maintaining of economies of vertical integration, and the likely willingness of private investors to offer significant bids for long-term franchise fees and, upon winning a franchise, to invest significant amounts into the maintenance and upgrading of their new railway infrastructures. As noted above, for the 10 railways franchised in the late 1990s in Brazil and Mexico, the winning bid was almost US$100,000 per track-km. The International Transport Forum calculates that just under 50% of the substantial investments made by the two largest Mexican concessionaires between 2007 and 2012 were allocated to track infrastructure -about US$1 billion total over that 6-year period (ITF, 2014) .
The most important points for originating traffic on UZ are the coal mining areas around Donetsk in the east and the iron ore and steelmaking areas around Dnipropetrovsk and Kryvyi Rih in the center-east. The port area around Odessa both originates and terminates a good deal of Black Sea freight. Generally, the heaviest freight flows go directly between the Russian border, through the Donbas and the Kryvbas, and either to the Odessa port area in the south, to Kyiv in the center-north, or to the western border crossings with Hungary, the Slovak Republic, and Poland.
Thus in the same way that both published scenarios for horizontal separation in the Russian railways begin with the notion of geographic competition based on multiple railways serving the coal-producing Kuzbas from different directions (Pittman, 2013b; RSPP, 2013) , a promising basis for horizontal competition in the Ukrainian railways in a hoped-for peaceful future could be the creation of an eastfacing railway connecting shippers originating coal, iron ore, and/or steel products with border crossings of the Russian Federation. RZhD would be one likely bidder for the franchise rights for this "Eastern Ukrainian Railway," but, as I have argued elsewhere, there are other likely candidates as well.
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At the western termination points of this Eastern Ukrainian Railway, the track infrastructure serving multiple shippers could be jointly controlled -as it is in Mexico -by the railway companies competing to carry freight in both directions as well as either the regional or federal government and/or the most important shippers themselves. From those points at the western termination of the Eastern Ukrainian Railway, either one or two additional railway enterprises could be created. The map below adds two independent railways heading west from the coal and steel regions, with shippers at Kharkiv enjoying geographic competition from three railways heading in three different directions, shippers at Kyiv, Odessa, and points in the Donbas and Kryvbas served by two railways, and both eastern and western borders served as well by two railways. Obviously much more work would have to be done to actually craft three (for example) potentially coherent railway enterprises from the overall national network (Map 4).
Conclusion
For now, at least, Ukraine labors under the significant burden of active hostilities in its eastern region at the same time as politicians, activists, and analysts work to create and implement economic reforms that would successfully create a dynamic and productive market economy. At a time when even the overall outlines of the future Ukrainian economy are uncertain, the railways are not at the top of many lists for attention. Yet Ukraine's economy of resource extraction, heavy industry, and agriculture promises to be dependent the existence of a reliable railway system for quite a long time, and a successful effort to get railway reforms right would be an important step in that direction.
To date, the European experience with vertical separation and third-party access regimes has appeared to enjoy considerably greater influence in the Ukrainian railways reform debates (and the Russian, and the Kazakh) than has the North and South American experience with horizontal separation. This is probably unfortunate, since the size of the country as well as the dominance of freight in its railway operations arguably makes the latter experience more directly applicable, and more likely to be adaptable in a straightforward manner to the Ukrainian context. In particular, if the country continues to basically copy the Russian railways reform agenda, it is likely to achieve the same results: increased private investment in rolling stock, but continued dependence on the unreliable state budget for funding for both locomotives and infrastructure.
I have argued here that the North and South American experience suggests that a country like Ukraine could use the horizontal separation strategy to carve two or three independent, vertically integrated freight railways from the existing system, railways of a size that has been shown to be viable in Brazil and Mexico, and that in a hoped-for peaceful future, international investors would likely be willing to bid large amounts for control rights to railway franchises so created as well as to then spend large amounts of their own capital to upgrade the competing regional railways. I have argued that the principal advantages of such a reform strategy are the creation of rail competition at multiple locations, the preservation of economies of vertical integration, and the likely elimination of the need for the Ukrainian railways to remain in the lengthy queue for government resources to upgrade and maintain the rolling stock, locomotives, and infrastructure.
Whether such a scenario is in fact the optimal path for the Ukrainian railways going forward is a question that clearly merits much deeper examination. The stakes at issue suggest that a simple decision to follow the previously adopted Russian-style reform plan may lock out the potential for much more promising options, and for a more dynamic and vibrant railway to support Ukrainian economic growth.
